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Abstract 
 
We study the political economy of instrument choice with an application to agricultural 
and food policies. We present stylized facts on the choice of policy instruments and 
develop a political economy theory of instrument choice. The key predictions of the 
model suggest a rational explanation of instrument choice patterns, based on the trade-off 
between transaction costs and distortions of the policies, and internal and external 
political constraints. Our empirical analysis supports the main predictions of the 
theoretical model. The shift from distortionary to less distortionary instruments is 
positively influenced by institutional development, a country’s net trade status, and the 
GATT/WTO framework.  
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The Political Economy of Policy Instrument Choice: 
Theory and Evidence from Agricultural and Food Policies 
 
Johan Swinnen, Alessandro Olper, Thijs Vandemoortele 
Introduction 
An extensive literature on the political economy of agricultural policies has developed 
over the past 20 years.  Papers in this literature have attempted to provide an explanation 
for the stylized facts on agricultural protection, such as the widely observed increase in 
agricultural protection when an economy grows -- see de Gorter and Swinnen (2002), 
Swinnen (2010) and Anderson et al. (2013) for reviews. Studies have attempted to 
provide an explanation for the stylized facts on agricultural protection, such as the widely 
observed increase in agricultural protection when an economy grows (Anderson and 
Hayami, 1986). Theoretical studies attempting to explain these and other facts have 
stressed the implications of organization costs on the political decision-making process 
(Gardner, 1987; Olson, 1990), structural factors affecting the distributional effects of 
agricultural protection (Anderson and Tyers, 1988; Honma and Hayami, 1986; Swinnen, 
1994), the relative income position of agriculture (Bullock, 1992; de Gorter and Tsur, 
1991; Swinnen and de Gorter, 1993) and political institutions like differences in electoral 
rules and the degree of democracy (Beghin and Kerallah, 1994; Swinnen et al., 2001; 
Olper, 2001; 2007; Olper and Raimondi, 2010). 
These political economy studies of agricultural policy have focused primarily on 
explaining the level of policy intervention and less attention is paid to the explanation of 
the instruments used for intervention (de Gorter and Swinnen, 2002). This bias in focus is 
an important shortcoming of the literature. From a welfare perspective the key question 
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should be why governments have introduced so many market distortions through 
agricultural policies. The distortionary effects of government interventions are equally 
dependent on the choice of the instrument as on the level of the intervention. Therefore 
the choice of instrument should be at least of equal concern as the intervention level.  In 
fact, both the trade and agricultural policy literature and the policy debates have reflected 
this importance (see e. g. Anderson and James, 2002; Gardner 1983).  In the policy 
world, the debate on the choice of instruments has been a very important element of 
policy discussions.  The differences in distortionary effects is recognized by the WTO in 
the classification of agricultural policy instruments in green, blue and amber boxes – with 
the green box for non-trade distorting policies instruments. This distinction between the 
level of support and the extent of market and trade distortions is at the heart of some 
important policy reforms, such as those of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
over the past two decades. In fact, one could argue that the issue of instrument choice was 
the key element of the CAP reform, more so than the level of support (Swinnen, 2008).   
Surprisingly, this attention to instrument choice in the literature and the policy 
debate has not translated in similar attention in studies on the political economy of 
agricultural and food policies where most of the focus has been on explaining the level of 
intervention rather than its form. A possible explanation for this bias in focus is 
differences in the availability of good empirical data, resulting in some well-known and 
puzzling stylized facts on policy level but not on instruments.1   
                                                           
1
 This argument may apply more widely, while there have been some studies in the general literature on 
explaining instrument choice, in particular why governments chose inefficient policies to redistribute 
income or protect certain groups (e.g. Cassing and Hillman, 1985; Rodrik, 1986; Coate and Morris, 1995; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001), these studies are almost exclusively theoretical. Only recently have there 
been a few empirical studies on the determinants of instrument choice, including Kono (2006) and 
Ederington and Minier (2006). 
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This paper is the first to present such stylized facts, partially drawing on OECD 
data.  The paper then proceeds to provide an explanation of these stylized facts.   
The paper is organized as follows. We first review related literature. Next we 
present stylized facts on instrument choice in agricultural and food policies. Then we 
develop a theoretical model and derive some key hypotheses. Afterwards we empirically 
test these hypotheses using an econometric study. The final section concludes. 
 
 
Instrument Choice in Agricultural Policy 
We first present some stylized facts on agricultural and food policy instrument choice in 
OECD countries over the past 25 years.2  
Since 1986 the OECD calculates policy support given to agriculture. The total 
amount of support to agriculture is referred to as Producer Support Estimate (PSE).3 The 
PSE data cover 28 countries, 12 of which are not OECD members, over the period 1986-
2009. The OECD’s calculation of policy support distinguishes between several 
instruments (see Table 1). For the purpose of our analysis it is convenient to combine the 
instruments into ’market price support’ (mps), ‘input subsidies’ (is) and ‘direct payments’ 
(dp). Their share in total support (PSE) is represented by mpsh, ish, and dpsh, 
respectively. 
                                                           
2
 For stylized facts on the historical evolution of agricultural policy instruments, see e.g. Tracy (1989), 
Josling (2007), Swinnen (2009);  and on the historical evolution of trade policy, see e.g. Irwin (2008); and 
Williamson (2003). 
3
 Initially the PSE calculations were only for OECD member states but more recently also some other 
countries, such as China and Brazil, are covered. For countries not belonging to the OECD, the time 
coverage is not complete: the first year observation is around 1990-92 and the last is 2007. 
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The first instrument, mps, includes all transfers through tariffs, price support and 
subsidies directly linked to agricultural production. These instruments are typically 
considered as being the most distortive. The second instrument, is, are input subsidies and 
cover a very heterogeneous set of measures, spanning from investment aids and labor 
subsidies to land protection programs. Finally, the third instrument, dp, includes fully 
decoupled and partially decoupled agricultural payments. These instruments are generally 
considered the least distortive. 
In the 1980s, the most important instrument was mps. The share of market price 
support in total support was 82%, whereas direct payments made up only 10%, and inputs 
subsidies 8%. In the next two decades the share of market price support has declined and 
that of direct payments increased substantially (Figure 1). By the late 2000s the former 
had decreased to 49% and the later increased to 61%. In contrast, the share of input 
subsidies remained about the same. 
The choice of instrument is correlated with (a) the level of development; (b) the 
trade status, and (c) the URAA GATT agreement. Figure 2 illustrates a positive empirical 
correlation between economic development and the use of direct payments and Errore. 
L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.3 shows a negative correlation with the export share. 
In addition, Figure 1 indicates that the shift from market price support to direct payments 
started in the early 1990s, which was the time of the conclusion of the URAA and has 
continued during the Doha WTO negotiations. GATT/WTO regulations distinguish 
between instruments according to their distortionary impact and limit the use of distorting 
measures while non-distorting measures are not regulated. More specifically, the WTO 
classifies agricultural policy instruments in green, blue and amber boxes – with the green 
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box for non-trade distorting policies instruments (see Josling and Tangermann, 1999; 
Tangermann, 1999; Josling, 2000 for more details). 
In summary, these empirical indications suggest that the choice of instruments is 
non-random. As stylized facts, we find that the choice of instruments is correlated with 
three factors: (a) a country’s level of development; (b) the URAA GATT agreement and 
the Doha WTO negotiations; and (c) a country’s trade status. We now develop a 
theoretical model to explain these stylized observations.  
Theory 
We use the same static framework as most models in the literature and consider the 
choice of governments between instruments in the absence of existing policies (see, e.g., 
Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Foster and Rausser, 1993; Kono, 2006). We assume that 
governments have perfect information on the impact of the various policy instruments, so 
there is no room for policy obfuscation. Consider that for some reason, e.g. a dramatic 
decline in world market prices for agricultural products, the government introduces 
policies to support producers’ incomes.  
We assume that the government has two different policy instruments at its disposal 
(see e.g. Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Rodrik, 1986; Coate and Morris, 1995) to transfer 
income to producers: instruments t  and s , which are assumed to have the following 
characteristics: 
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 Distortions Transaction Costs Impact on Government Revenue 
t  High Low Positive if net importing; Negative if net exporting 
s  Low High Strongly negative 
 
Policy t  has low transaction costs but high costs of market distortions, and has a positive 
(negative) impact on government revenue if the country is a net importer (exporter). 
Policy s  causes fewer distortions but is characterized by high transaction costs, and has a 
strongly negative impact on government revenue, independent of the country’s trade 
status. Even if the country is a net exporter, the impact of instrument s  on government 
revenue is more negative than instrument t ’s impact. One could think of tariffs vis-à-vis 
lump-sum transfers, or market price support vis-à-vis direct income support as examples 
of policies t  and s , respectively.  
As in Kono (2006), we assume that governments need both voter support and 
money to stay in power. Money can be raised both through interest-group contributions 
and through revenues from the implementation of policy instruments. Our assumptions 
imply a modified Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of government decision-making 
where, in line with Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (2000), the government maximizes a 
weighted sum of interest group contributions, policy revenues, and total voter support: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ; ,R VG t s C t s R t s V t sω α β ω= + + , (1) 
where G  is government utility, C  are the interest-group contributions, R  measures the 
budgetary costs or revenues of the policy instruments, and V  is total voter support. t  and 
s  are the income transfers of the two policy instruments, and  

 and Vω  are the weights that the government gives to respectively revenue 
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considerations and total voter support. β  represents the trade balance of that country, and 
α  is an inverse measure for a country’s institutional development. In developing 
countries – with relatively underdeveloped institutions – raising revenue through foreign 
trade taxes constitutes the single largest source of public revenue (Burgess and Stern, 
1993; Rodrik, 1995; Bates and Block, 2010). The revenue motive is therefore more 
imperative in countries with less developed institutions. Since α  inversely measures the 
country’s institutional development, we assume that the weight attached by the 
government to the revenue function increases with less developed institutions 0
Rω
α
 ∂
> ∂ 
. 
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that the interest group consists of 
active lobbyists that solicit income transfers from the government. For this purpose the 
interest group offers the government a schedule that lists the interest group’s 
contributions as a function of the income transfers. The interest-group contributions 
( ),C t s  rise with the level of the income transfers ( )0;  0t sC C> > , but at a decreasing 
rate ( )0;  0;  0tt ss tsC C C< < < .4 
The policy revenue function ( ), ;R t s β  is assumed to be decreasing in policy 
instrument s  ( )0sR < , whereas the revenue impact of instrument t  can be either positive 
( )0tR >  or negative ( )0tR < , depending on the trade status of the country (respectively 
net importing or net exporting). We assume that 
s tR R<  to represent that instrument s  
has a highly negative impact on government revenue, even more negative than instrument 
                                                           
4
 Subscripts t  and s  denote partial derivatives. 
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t  in the case of a net-exporting country. ( ),R t s  is concave in the income transfers 
( )0;  0;  0tt ss tsR R R< < < . In line with the marginal impact of instrument t  being 
respectively positive and negative for a net-importing and net-exporting country, the 
impact of an increase in the trade balance, β , on instrument t ’s marginal revenue impact 
is negative, i.e. 0tR β < . The negative revenue impact of instrument s  is independent of 
the trade balance: 0sR β = . 
The function for total voter support, ( ),V t s , is given by 
 ( ) ( ), , t sV t s W t s b t b sα α= − − , (2) 
where the first term, ( ),W t s , represents total voter welfare, and the second and third 
terms, tb tα  and sb sα , measure the total transaction costs related to each instrument. As 
before, α  is an inverse measure for the country’s institutional development. In an 
unfavourable institutional environment where institutions are underdeveloped and the 
administrative capacity is low, transaction costs are higher for the same amount of 
income transfer (Burgess and Stern, 1993). Since policy t  involves lower transaction 
costs than policy s  for the same amount of income transfer, we assume that 0s tb b> ≥ . 
Hence tb α  and sb α  are the average transaction costs per unit of the income transfers t  
and s . 
As both policy instruments are distortionary measures, ( ),W t s  is decreasing in the 
income transfers ( )0;  0t sW W< <  at an increasing rate ( )0;  0;  0tt ss tsW W W< < < . 
Instrument t  is more distorting than instrument s , so t sW W< . 
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 The equilibrium pair of income transfers ( )* *,t s  is determined by the first order 
conditions (FOCs):5 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , ; , 0
, , ; , 0.
R V V t
t t t t
R V V s
s s s s
G C t s R t s W t s b
G C t s R t s W t s b
ω α β ω ω α
ω α β ω ω α
 = + + − =

= + + − =
 (3) 
Define th
t s
=
+
 as the share of policy t  in the total income transfer. Comparative 
statics on the equilibrium 
*
*
* *
th
t s
=
+
 for changes in the institutional development of a 
country, α , and the country’s trade balance, β , yield Results 1 and 2. 
Result 1: If 1
s
ss
t
ts
Gb
b G
> >  and 1t ts
s ss
R G
R G
< < : * 0dh dα > . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Result 1 implies that in countries with lower institutional capacity, where policy 
transaction costs are higher and the revenue motive is more important, ceteris paribus, 
                                                           
5
 The Hessian matrix of the government’s objective function is ( ) tt ts
ts ss
G G
H G
G G
 
=  
 
. In order to obtain a 
global maximum and to perform comparative statics, this matrix must be negative definite. Since all the 
Hessian’s elements are negative, 
0
0
0
R V
tt tt tt tt
R V
ts ts ts ts
R V
ss ss ss ss
G C R W
G C R W
G C R W
ω ω
ω ω
ω ω
 = + + <

= + + <

= + + <
, the matrix is negative definite if 
( ) 2det 0tt ss tsH G G G= − >  (Winston, 2004). To secure uniqueness of the equilibrium and reaction 
function stability, in line with Brander and Spencer (1983) and Dixit (1984), we assume that the own 
effects of the income transfers on marginal contributions, revenue, and total voter welfare exceed cross 
effects such that tt stG G<  and ss stG G< .  
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the relative share of income transfer *t  is higher in equilibrium. Hence countries with less 
developed institutions ( α  higher) will apply relatively more distorting policies ( *h  
larger), provided that the transaction costs of the more distorting policy are sufficiently 
lower than that of the other policy 1
s
ss
t
ts
Gb
b G
 
> > 
 
, and that the less distorting policy has a 
sufficiently more negative impact on government revenue 1t ts
s ss
R G
R G
 
< < 
 
. The latter 
condition is always fulfilled if the more distorting policy has a positive impact on 
government revenue ( )0tR > . 
To illustrate this result, take the specific case of a net-importing country. In that 
case, 0tR > , and the second condition is fulfilled. If in addition the more distorting 
instrument ( )t  involves no transaction costs, i.e. 0tb = , the first condition holds as well. 
It is clear from Result 1 and the proof in Appendix that in this specific case, an increase 
of the institutional development of a country (α  lower) will always result in a higher 
relative share of the less distorting policy instrument *s  in equilibrium ( *h  smaller). The 
result also holds under less strict conditions, which are discussed in Appendix. 
Result 2: * 0dh dβ < . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Result 2 implies that if the trade balance of a country increases ( β  increases), the relative 
share of the more distorting policy in the total income transfer decreases ( *h  decreases). 
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For example, if for some exogenous reason a country’s imports decrease, ceteris paribus, 
the country will shift to using the less distorting policy relatively more, although it 
involves relatively higher transaction costs. 
Empirical Analysis 
To formally test whether our theoretical hypotheses are consistent with the observed 
evidence on instrument choices we use the share of market price support in total support 
(mpsh) as a proxy for the instrument t and the share of direct payments in total support 
(dpsh) as a proxy for the instrument s. As we explained in section 2, the OECD data on 
instrument choice cover 28 countries over the 1986-2009 period.6 
We proxy the institutional development and administrative capacity of a country by 
real GDP per capita (gdppc), taken from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank). As an indicator of the trade status we use the net export share in total production 
(exsh), based on FAO data.7 To capture the effect of international agreement, we include 
a dummy variable, d_gatt. This dummy takes the value of 1 since 1995 (0 otherwise). 
1995 was the first year of the GATT Agreement implementation, which has introduced 
more constraints on the use of highly distortionary policy instruments like mps, than on 
lower distortionary instruments, like dp. In fact, fully decoupled policies which are not 
trade distorting are allowed under WTO principles.  
                                                           
6
 In some cases, the PSE and the some instruments are negative: 13.3% of the observations have negative 
values for mpsh and 7.2% for dpsh. We dealt with this problem in three different ways. First, we 
recalculated mpsh and dpsh variables using absolute values of each instrument. Second, we ran the 
regressions excluding the negative values for mpsh or dpsh. Third, we ran the regressions with the 
subsample of the OECD member countries only, where there are no negative values. The model results are 
robust across different samples.  
 
7
 More specifically, exsh = (export value – import value) / production value. 
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As control variable and to account for path dependency and the persistence of 
policies, we include the level of the dependent variable in the previous period.  
Finally, one may argue that from a conceptual point of view, the empirical model 
should also include the level of support (PSE). By including PSE as explanatory variable, 
one can analyze the relation between the policy level and instrument choice. However, 
there are two econometric reasons that render the inclusion of the level of support in our 
instrument choice equations problematic. First, PSE is endogenous, as the level of 
support is likely to depend itself on the policy instrument. Second, our explanatory 
variables, exsh, gdppc, and d_gatt, are also important determinants of the overall 
protection level. While the first problem could be solved potentially by using a 
simultaneous equation model, the second problem precludes finding good instruments for 
PSE in the mpsh and dpsh equations. We therefore do not include PSE in the regressions. 
Summarizing, in what follows we will run the following specifications:  
ititititit gattdexshgdppcmpshmpsh νααααα +++++= −−− _41312110  
ititititit gattdexshgdppcdpshdpsh ηβββββ +++++= −−− _41312110  
 
where 1α  and 1β  are expected to be positive; 2α , 3α , and 4α  are expected to be negative; 
and 2β , 3β , and 4β  are expected to be positive.   
We first run the regressions using OLS and later do robustness tests with 
alternative estimation techniques.  The OLS regressions are in Table 2. All the relevant 
variables have their expected signs and are statistically significant at the 95% level or 
more. Moreover, the adjusted R2 of the models, ranging from 0.58 to 0.80, indicates the 
high explanatory power of the selected variables.  
- 14 - 
gdppc has a significant negative effect on mpsh, the share of market price support, 
and gdppc a significant positive effect on dpsh, the share of direct income support. These 
results are consistent with our theoretical argument that countries with lower 
administrative capacity and lower institutional development have a preference for price 
support. Also in line with our hypothesis, the net export share has a significant negative 
effect on mpsh, and a positive and significant effect on dpsh. 
The 1994 GATT Agreement as captured by the dummy d_gatt is significantly 
negatively correlated with mpsh, and positively with dpsh. These results are consistent 
with the argument that the GATT constraints exert an effect on instrument choices: mpsh 
declined on average after the implementation of the 1994 GATT agreement, and dpsh 
increased. 
In all regressions the coefficients of the lagged value of the dependent variable are 
positive and strongly significant. The magnitude of the lagged coefficients, ranging from 
0.66 to 0.86, confirm a strong level of persistency in instrument choice.  
Robustness Tests 
We performed a series of additional robustness test. First, a potential problem in applying 
OLS to our specification is that the lagged dependent variable can be endogenous to the 
fixed effects in the error term, which gives the well know dynamic panel bias (see, e.g., 
Roodman, 2009). A first step to deal with this is by removing the fixed effects from the 
error term, running the standard Least Square with Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimator. 
In doing so, we also control for any unobserved heterogeneity that are correlated with our 
explanatory variables.  
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The LSDV regression results show that the fixed effects are jointly significant 
suggesting that their inclusion is correct. As expected, the estimated coefficients of the 
lagged dependent variable are lower in magnitude, but still strongly significant and have 
their expected signs. The effect of the trade status is estimated with less precision. 
A potential problem with LSDV is that this dynamic panel estimator may be biased, 
when applied to a panel structure where the year dimension, T, is lower than the number 
of individual (countries) N, due to the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. To 
address this potential source of bias, the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) is used. This means estimating a system with the first-differences and 
the level equations, where the endogenous variables are instrumented by their level in the 
first-differenced equation and first-differenced instruments for the equation in level. The 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests, indicate the presence of first order serial 
correlation, but no second order serial correlation, suggesting that the model dynamic is 
correctly specified. Moreover, the standard Hansen test confirms that in all cases our set 
of instruments is valid.8  
Also the system GMM regression results show that the trade status and the level of 
development affect negatively the share of market price support and positively the share 
of direct payments, the GATT dummy causes a shift from market price towards direct 
income support, and the lagged dependent variable indicates strong persistency of policy 
instruments.  
                                                           
8
 According to Roodman (2009), the instrument count does not exceed the number of groups and, to control 
for instrument proliferation that cause a weak Hansen test, we used the xtabond2 collapse option in 
STATA, instead of all available lags for instruments. 
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Conclusion 
We developed a theoretical political economy model in this paper to explain how various 
factors affect policy instruments choices. The theoretical model provides hypotheses on 
policy instrument use which are consistent with stylized facts, i.e., (a) their correlation 
with the level of a country’s institutional development; (b) their correlation with a 
country’s net trade position; and (c) the impact of GATT/WTO negotiations. Moreover, 
the model explains these key observations with a rational choice political economy model 
without having to rely on imperfect information of policy effects or on theories of 
bureaucratic inertia and obstruction. An econometrically test using OECD data on 
instrument choice in agricultural policy are consistent with the hypotheses.  
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Table 1. Support by policy instrument based on OECD PSE database 
 
Notes: The values are averages for the periods. The policy instruments considered are based on the 
following items of the PSE database: ‘market price support’ refers to support based on commodity outputs 
(items A1 and A2, of the PSE database); ‘input subsidies’ is the sum of payments based on input use and 
miscellaneous payments (items B and G); ‘direct payments’ refer to different payments decoupled or 
partially decoupled from production (items from C to F).  
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010). 
 
Value Share Value Share
Market price support 195,839 0.82 125,215 0.49
Input subsidies 20,400 0.09 33,403 0.13
Direct payments 22,425 0.09 98,146 0.38
Total PSE  (Milions US $) 238,665 1.00 256,764 1.00
Percentage PSE 
1986-88 2007-09
37 22
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Table 2. Regression results 
Dependent variable mpsh dpsh 
Estimations strategies  OLS Fixed effects 
System GMM 
regressions OLS Fixed effects 
System GMM 
regressions 
One Step Two Step One Step Two Step 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
gdppc -0.0018 -0.0107 -0.0035 -0.0036 0.0015 0.0085 0.0023 0.0027 
2.98*** 3.50*** 3.21*** 2.94*** 4.14*** 3.98*** 2.70** 2.93*** 
Exsh -0.0650 -0.0571 -0.1147 -0.1190 0.0132 0.0444 0.0195 0.0162 
5.51*** 1.28 5.06*** 4.78*** 1.45 1.77* 1.19 1.01 
d_GATT -0.0511 -0.0472 -0.0882 -0.0871 0.0197 0.0273 0.0309 0.0274 
4.03*** 2.46** 4.15*** 4.00*** 3.16*** 2.42** 4.14*** 3.48*** 
Lagged_mpsh(dpsh) 0.6608 0.4582 0.395 0.405 0.8038 0.5671 0.693 0.686 
13.99*** 8.29*** 4.83*** 4.72*** 19.01*** 8.82*** 7.58*** 7.62*** 
Fixed Effects NO YES - - NO YES - - 
Obs. 517 517 517 517 517 517 517 517 
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Number of instruments - - 27 27   27 27 
F-Statistics 82.4 78.7 - - 152.6 197.8 - - 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.64 - - 0.75 0.80 - - 
Test for AR(1): Pr > z - - 0.000 0.002 - - 0.003 0.015 
Test for AR(2): Pr > z - - 0.245 0.334 - - 0.246 0.241 
Hansen overid.: Pr > chi2 - - 0.315 0.215 - - 0.417 0.464 
Notes: (1) t-statistics based on clustered standard errors under coefficients. (2) All regressions include also a constant term. (3) For 
System GMM regression, t-statistics based on robust standard error under the coefficients. The System GMM estimator is 
implemented in SATA using the xtabound2 routine, with the option collapse to limit the instruments proliferation. (4) ***. ** and * p-
value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 respectively.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of total PSE and its coupled (mps) and decoupled (dps) 
components in the OECD (in %) 
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010) 
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Figure 2.  Relation between the the level of development and the share of direct 
payments in total support (dpsh) and the ratio of direct payments over product value 
(dp/q), average values 1986-2009 
 
 
 
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010) 
 
 
Figure 3. Relation between the net export share (exsh) and the share of market price 
support in total support (mpsh) and the ration of market price support over output 
value (mp/q) (average values 1986-2009) 
 
 
 
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010) 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Share of market price support, input subsidies and direct payments in 
PSE 
 
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010). 
 
 
mpsh ish dpsh mpsh ish dpsh
OECD countries
European Union 1986-2009 0.92 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.14 0.60
United States 1986-2009 0.44 0.18 0.37 0.18 0.30 0.51
Australia 1986-2009 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.51 0.49
Switzerland 1986-2009 0.83 0.10 0.07 0.54 0.06 0.41
Norway 1986-2009 0.72 0.10 0.18 0.55 0.05 0.40
Canada 1986-2009 0.56 0.16 0.28 0.58 0.07 0.35
Slovakia 1986-2003 0.88 0.08 0.04 0.51 0.19 0.31
Iceland 1986-2009 0.93 0.07 0.00 0.65 0.08 0.27
Czech Republic 1986-2003 0.82 0.05 0.14 0.64 0.11 0.25
Mexico 1986-2009 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.35 0.43 0.22
Hungary 1986-2003 0.80 0.06 0.14 0.54 0.30 0.16
Japan 1986-2009 0.93 0.04 0.03 0.88 0.03 0.09
Turkey 1986-2009 0.77 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.03 0.05
Korea 1986-2009 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.03 0.05
New Zealand 1986-2009 0.19 0.48 0.32 0.42 0.55 0.03
Poland 1986-2003 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.60 0.38 0.01
Non OECD countries
Latvia 1986-2003 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.36 0.38
China 1993-2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.21 0.48 0.31
Ukraine 1986-2007 0.81 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.37 0.24
Slovenia 1986-2003 0.88 0.09 0.03 0.73 0.05 0.22
Estonia 1986-2003 0.88 0.10 0.01 0.51 0.32 0.17
Lithuania 1986-2003 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.23 0.14
Romania 1986-2005 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.89 0.07 0.04
Russia 1986-2007 0.65 0.24 0.11 0.54 0.44 0.03
Brazil 1995-2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.53 0.46 0.02
Chile 1990-2007 0.96 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.86 0.01
South Africa 1994-2007 0.97 0.03 0.01 0.69 0.31 0.00
Bulgaria 1986-2005 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.69 0.00
Initial year Final yearPeriod 
coverage
